The concept of cultural capital has been increasingly used in American sociology to study the impact of cultural reproduction on social reproduction. However, much confusion surrounds this concept. In this essay, we disentangle Bourdieu and Passeron's original work on cultural capital, specifying the theoretical roles cultural capital plays in their model, and the various types of high status signals they are concerned with. We expand on their work by proposing a new definition of cultural capital which focuses on cultural and social exclusion. We note a number of theoretical ambiguities and gaps in the original model, as well as specific methodological problems. In the second section, we shift our attention to the American literature on cultural capital. We discuss its assumptions and compare it with the original work. We also propose a research agenda which focuses on social and cultural selection and decouples cultural capital from the French context in which it was originally conceived to take into consideration the distinctive features of American culture. This agenda consists in 1) assessing the relevance of the concept of legitimate culture in the U.S.; 2) documenting the distinctive American repertoire of high status cultural signals; and 3) analyzing how cultural capital is turned into profits in America.
INTRODUCTION
Culture has recently become an "in" topic in both American and European sociology. This trend is not an intellectual fad, as a large number of researchers are seriously engaged in dealing with the theoretically central issue of the interaction between culture and social structure. We are here concerned with scrutinizing a small segment of this growing field, the recent work on cultural capital. This concept-defined as high status cultural signals used in cultural and social selectionwas first developed by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron to analyze how culture and education contribute to social reproduction. Born in France, the concept of cultural capital has been imported to the U.S. and used to account for phenomena ranging from the political attitudes of the new middle class (Gouldner 1979; Lamont 1986; Martin and Szelenyi 1987) , to the structure of the stratification system (Collins 1979 As work dealing with cultural capital has grown, the concept has come to assume a large number of, at times, contradictory meanings. Cultural capital has been operationalized as knowledge of high culture (DiMaggio and Useem 1978) and educational attainment (Robinson and Gamier 1985) . Others defined it as the curriculum of elite schools (Cookson and Persell 1985a) , the symbolic mastery of "practices" (Martin and Szelenyi 1987) , the capacity to perform tasks in culturally acceptable ways (Gouldner 1979) , and participation in high culture events (DiMaggio and Mohr 1985). Still other researchers viewed cultural capital as "symbols . . in accord with specific class interests" (Dubin 1986 ) and "the stock of ideas and concepts acquired from previous encounters" (Collins 1987 ). This proliferation of definitions, undoubtedly a sign of intellectual vitality-and possibly, of the fruitfulness of the concept-has created sheer confusion. We are now reaching a point where the concept could become obsolete, as those using it equate it with notions as different as human 
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concerned with "the contribution made by the educational system [and family socialization] to the reproduction of the structure of power relationships and symbolic relationships between classes, by contributing to the reproduction of the structure of distribution of cultural capital among these classes" (Bourdieu 1977a [1971] , p. 487). The well-known argument goes as follows: schools are not socially neutral institutions but reflect the experiences of the "dominant class." Children from this class enter school with key social and cultural cues, while working class and lower class students must acquire the knowledge and skills to negotiate their educational experience after they enter school. Although they can acquire the social, linguistic, and cultural competencies which characterize the uppermiddle and middle class, they can never achieve the natural familiarity of those born to these classes and are academically penalized on this basis. Because differences in academic achievement are normally explained by differences in ability rather than by cultural resources transmitted by the family, social transmission of privileges is itself legitimized, for academic standards are not seen as handicapping lower class children. Bourdieu and Passeron's argument on social reproduction is in some respects similar to the arguments made by researchers who studied the discriminatory character of schools by looking at language interaction patterns (Heath 1982; , counseling and placement (Cicourel and Kitsuse 1969), ability groupings ( Rist 1970) , the implementation of the curriculum (Anyon 1981), and authority relations in the classroom (Wilcox 1982) . These studies have all pointed to the subtle and not so subtle ways that formally meritocratic institutions help to recreate systems of social stratification. However, rather than interpreting these patterns as examples of an individual's or school's discriminatory behavior, Bourdieu and Passeron saw these behaviors as institutionalized. Their analysis was more structural, and as such provided a sociologically more powerful framework for explaining the "taken-for-granted routines" of daily life.
Bourdieu has continued to develop his general theory, while Passeron has worked on a number of theoretical problems, including cultural reproduction (Passeron 1986 Bourdieu (1987 Bourdieu ( [1979 ) distinguishes three types of cultural capital: embodied (or incorporated) cultural capital (i.e., the legitimate cultural attitudes, preferences, and behaviors [which he calls practices] that are internalized during the socialization process), objectified cultural capital (i.e., the transmittable goods-books, computers, particle accelerators, paintings-that require embodied cultural capital to be appropriated), and institutionalized cultural capital (i.e., the degrees and diplomas which certify the value of embodied cultural capital items). Therefore "institutionalized cultural capital" could be used to refer to cultural capital performing the functions of power resource and indicator to class position: because it is certified, widely diffused across classes and quantifiable, it can be used as an indicator of class position. It can also refer to cultural capital used as a power resource, because credentials facilitate access to organizational positions. unequally valued signals itself; therefore, again, he adopts a more structural and less individualistic approach to status attribution.
The authors often use the term "legitimate culture" interchangeably with cultural capital.5 Yet, they don't specify if by legitimate culture they mean signals which are largely believed to be "most valued" (i.e., prestigious) or if they refer to those that are "respectable" (i.e., good but not prestigious) (Bourdieu 1984 (Bourdieu [1979 , p. 228). This is a significant distinction because prestigious signals would be salient for controlling access to high status positions, while "respectable" signals would act to exclude lower class members from middle class circle.6
It is important to note in this context that we believe that lower class high status cultural signals (e.g., being streetwise) perform within the lower class the same exclusivist function that the legitimate culture performs in the middle and the upper-middle class. However, for the purpose of clarity, the term cultural capital is not applied to these signals because they cannot be equated with the legitimate culture. A new concept needs to be coined for these signals; "marginal high status signal" is a potential candidate.
Methodological issue
The This solution does not seem to be satisfying: in a large and highly differentiated society, the defining process is not a zero-sum one, as cultural practices are not all compared continuously and equally to one another, the situation posited by Bourdieu being as unlikely as ideal market conditions.8 Consequently, the relational answer is empirically insufficient-although analytically appealing, as suggested by the success of structuralism. mobility (1985a, p. 724) . It is mostly converted into symbolic capital, i.e., legitimacy and prestige, a point that conceptually differentiates cultural capital from human capital."1 The market metaphor seems to us justified because the various types of capitals are rare and highly desirable resources, and are used as generalized medium of exchange; however, we believe that this metaphor is less suitable in societies where the cultural consensus is weak, and where the definition of high status cultural signals, and their yields, varies across groups.
We have argued that Bourdieu and Passeron provide a more structural approach to discrimination in school settings, cultural selection and status attribution by focusing on institutionalized signals. They also provide a more sophisticated conception of social exclusion than Weber does, as they point out various forms of indirect exclusion. Yet, even if Bourdieu's work is extremely rich and 10 One of several differences between Bourdieu's work and the exchange theory of power is that the latter pays much attention to how dependence arises from individuals' emotional (or subjective) investment in resources (e.g., Emerson 1962). Bourdieu seems to assume that the control of resources alone triggers dependency; at least, he does not discuss how variations in need, availability, and emotional investment affects dependency relations and power.
1 Bourdieu considers both the symbolic and the economic profits bestowed by cultural capital, while human capital theorists ignore symbolic profits. Also, human capital theorists neglect the structure of possible profits, which varies by social class and which, according to Bourdieu, explains differences in investment in cultural capital: "Economists might seem to deserve credit for explicitly raising the question of the relationship between the rates of profit on educational investment and on economic investment (and its evolution However, a consensus of high status cultural signals could very well be less stable in the U.S. than it is in France, for the public for various types of cultural goods changes rapidly, e.g., country music went from being rural music to working class music after WWII (Peterson and DiMaggio 1975 ; for an empirical assessment of the level of consensus in the U.S. cf. DiMaggio and Ostrower 1987; no comparative data is available at this point). Frequent cultural innovation, as well as transgressions between cultural genres and styles (e.g., Californian cuisine, winecoolers, the Boston Pops) probably constantly redefine hierarchies of signals. Race, and to a lesser extent, ethnicity, would also have a negative effect on the cultural consensus. Consequently, symbolic boundaries between 161 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY "legitimate" and "illegitimate" cultures are likely to be weaker.
The permeability of symbolic boundariesor the existence of a legitimate culture-can be identified by documenting struggles around these boundaries between members of lifestyle clusters, which is a most urgent task for evaluating the usefulness of the notion of cultural capital for studying American society. Boundaries exist only if they are "repeatedly tested by persons on the fringes of the group and repeatedly defended by persons chosen to represent the group's inner morality." (Erikson 1966, p. 23) . Therefore, cultural laissez-faire, or infrequent direct cultural exclusion based on a random land variable set of criteria, would be indicators of an ill-defined and weakly differentiated legitimate culture.
We believe that the "class racism" (or cultural intolerance) described in Distinction is more frequent in France than, let's say, in the American Midwest, which would reflect 1) the existence of a less strongly differentiated legitimate culture; and 2) a greater autonomy of lower class high status cultural signals from middle class ones. But this issue needs to be empirically explored.'3 The problem of stability of cultural boundaries goes unmentioned in Bourdieu's work. This is one area in which researchers could expand on the French work in a theoretically fruitful way.
Documenting American forms of cultural capital
We have seen that, as research on cultural capital has spread, definitions of the concept have multiplied. On the whole, however, studies have followed Bourdieu and paid special attention to "high culture" in pointing out the items that make up the legitimate culture. Most notably, DiMaggio and colleagues operationalized cultural capital as knowledge of classical music and participation in the fine arts (DiMaggio 1982; DiMaggio and Useem 1978; 1982-cf., also 13 One of the few researchers working on the problem of cross-national differences in the influence of cultural selection on the stratification system is Richard Munch (1988) . Also, Ganzeboom (1986) found that cultural socialization affects status attainment in a similar way in the U.S., the Netherlands and Hungary, which suggests that cultural and social selection functions similarly in these three national settings. Cookson and Persell 1985a; 1985b) . Although this choice has often been a wise choice given the data available'4, no one has yet empirically tested if participation in high culture events is an adequate indicator of cultural capital in the U.S. Firsthand experience with American culture-especially outside the East Coast-could cast doubt on the centrality of high culture participation as a basis for social and cultural selection.
Documenting the socially and historically specific forms of American cultural capital is now an urgent empirical task. At this point, much of our knowledge concerning high status cultural signals is located in "how to" books which spell out in detail the proper symbols and behaviors that assist occupational success, including clothing, jewelry, conversation styles, gift giving, alcohol consumption, dinner party etiquette, leisure time activities, and community service. Biographies of upwardly mobile individuals which reveal how they changed their dress, speech, household furnishings, and dietary patterns to fit in their new milieux also provide valuable information scattered in bits and pieces.
In order to systematically document the American forms of cultural capital in America, one could identify clusters of people who share similar repertoires of institutionalized signals by interviewing managers, professionals and entrepreneurs on their preferences and lifestyles-the latter being seen as ideal by Americans (Coleman and Rainwater (1978 Bourdieu and Passeron's work improves on others by providing a more structural theory of discrimination in school settings, and a more dynamic approach to social reproduction which leaves room for agency. It also takes a more structural view at status attribution as it looks at institutionalized signals. Simultaneously, the relational method of identification of cultural capital presents important operationalization problems, which result in contested conclusions concerning the subordinate nature of lower class culture. Furthermore, many aspects of the framework remain undertheorized, particularly concerning the theory of power underlying the work.
In order to build on the important available American work, and to make cultural capital less bound to the French context in which it was developed, we proposed to step back and 1) assess the relevance of cultural capital in the U.S.; 2) document the American repertoire of high status cultural signals; and 3) analyze how capital is turned into profits in American organizations and schools. This could be done by analyzing 1) conflicts around symbolic boundaries; 2) the weight of various items in the legitimate culture (e.g., high culture vs sport connoisseurship, purchasable vs non-purchasable signals); and 3) the day-to-day process and micro-level interactions where individuals activate their cultural capital to gain access to social settings or attain desired social results.
While Weber was mostly concerned with status groups, and Bourdieu, with differentiated class cultures and their relationship to the legitimate culture or cultural capital, we are reaching the conclusion that more attention should be given to the institutionalized repertoire of high status cultural signals and to conflicts around symbolic boundaries. Our program would avoid the pitfalls of the original framework, particularly the confusion concerning multiple functions of cultural capital, and the unsupported assumptions relative to the relational nature of the cultural CULTURAL CAPITAL system and the lack of autonomy of dominated culture. It would also preserve some of the advantages of the original framework, by retaining Bourdieu and Passeron's sophisticated analysis of direct and indirect exclusion, which largely accounts for the original success of their theory.
Cultural capital can improve our understanding of the way in which social origin provides advantages in social selection. In particular, by focusing on the "investment" practices, it stands to yield a more active and dynamic model of social reality. Further work on cultural capital, which unravels cultural reproduction while highlighting individual strategies, stands to make an important contribution to research on culture, power, and social stratification.
